Recent Supreme Court Developments In Employment Law - Part II
© 1999 by Elliott A. Myles, Esq.
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Analysis
1. When is an impairment a disability?
In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., and Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, the Court was asked to answer two threshold questions. The first question was how to evaluate whether an impairment, that is a physical or mental condition, is also a disability protected by the ADA.
In Sutton, the Court held that making such an evaluation involved an "individualized analysis." The allegedly disabled individual must show that his or her impairment after any corrective or mitigating measures (such as contact lenses or glasses for nearsightedness, insulin medication for diabetes, etc.) substantially and actually limits one or more of his or her major life activities. Applying this analysis, the Court ruled that two nearsighted pilots whose vision was near perfect with glasses or contact lenses were not disabled, and therefore were not qualified individuals under the ADA. With glasses or contacts, the pilots' impairment - nearsightedness - was corrected, and did not substantially limit their major life activities.
In Murphy, the Court applied its ruling in Sutton to a mechanic who took medication for hypertension. When the mechanic took his medication, his high blood pressure did not limit any of his major life activities. Accordingly, the Court held that he was not disabled.
The Court applied Sutton to a truck driver with amblyopia or monocular vision in Albertson's. The Court of Appeal had found that the truck driver was disabled, because the way the truck driver saw "differed significantly" from the way people with 20/20 vision see. Additionally, the Court of Appeal did not take into effect the fact that the truck driver had learned to compensate for his amblyopia, and appeared to take the position that monocularity was automatically a disability. The Supreme Court strongly disagreed with these findings. The test is not a "significant difference" in the manner of doing things, but is a "significant limitation" on major life activities; self-compensation is as relevant as compensation by other means, such as glasses or medication; and the determination of disability must be made on a case-by-case or individual basis.
In a nutshell, the Court found that while every disability is an impairment, not every impairment is a disability. Instead, only impairments, even after being corrected or mitigated, which substantially and actually limit a person's major life activities are disabilities.
2. What is a "Regarded As" Disability?
The second question answered by the Court involved the proof necessary to show that an employer regarded an individual as having a disability. Under this definition of "disability", an individual must show that the employer mistakenly believed that the individual has a substantially limiting impairment, when in fact, the individual had no impairment, or the impairment was not substantially limiting.
In Sutton, the pilots argued that the airline mistakenly believed that their nearsightedness substantially limited them from flying as global airline pilots, and in Murphy, the mechanic argued that his employer mistakenly believed that his hypertension substantially limited his ability to work as a mechanic required to drive commercial motor vehicles. The Court rejected both of these arguments.
The Court found that, at best, the pilots and the mechanic had shown that their impairment stopped them from working at one particular job - global airline pilot or commercial motor vehicle mechanic. This by itself did not satisfy the test under the ADA, which is whether the individual was regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs utilizing his or her skills. The Court specifically found that the pilots were eligible to work as regional pilots or pilot instructors, and that the mechanic was eligible to work as a diesel mechanic or automotive mechanic, and in fact had found another job as a mechanic soon he was fired.
Essentially, the Court held something which stops a person from working just one job in a class of employment is not by itself substantially limiting.
3. How Do These 3 Cases Affect State Law Disability Discrimination Claims?
The ADA is only one remedy available to an individual who believes that he or she has been discriminated against on the disability. Like the ADA, the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) prohibits disability based discrimination.
The FEHA definition of "mental disability" has been held by the California courts to be essentially the same as the ADA definition of disability caused by a mental impairment. On the other hand, the FEHA definition of "physical disability" differs from the ADA's definition in several material ways. Under FEHA, a physical disability is defined as (1) a physiological condition affecting a major body system and limiting a person's ability to participate in major life activities, (2) a health condition requiring special education or related services, (3) being regarded as having a disability, or (4) being regarded as having a physiological or health condition which is not presently disabling but may become so. However, the FEHA definitions of "mental disability" and "physical disability" do not include conditions excluded from the federal definition of "disability" under the ADA.
Based upon the statutory definitions, the principles adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Sutton, Murphy, and Albertson's should apply with equal force to lawsuits under FEHA, with two potential exceptions. First, FEHA creates a separate definition of disability as a condition requiring special education or related services. This type of disability is not addressed by the ADA. Accordingly, Sutton, Murphy, and Albertson's would not necessarily apply to this definition.
Second, FEHA splits the definition of a "regarding as" disability into two definitions, adding the additional of time. Unlike the ADA, FEHA defines "disability" to include being regarded as having a condition which is either disabling in the present or disabling in the future. Applying the principles adopted in Sutton, Murphy, and Albertson's, an individual alleging "regarded as" discrimination should be required to show that the employer mistakenly believed that the individual suffered from a condition either that substantially limits his or her major life activities at the time the employer made the employment decision, or that will substantially limit his or her major life activities at some time in the future.
4. Has the Supreme Court Made Disability Discrimination Lawsuits Impossible?
No. The dissent in Sutton argued that the Court's opinion would exclude people who use prosthetic limbs or take medication for epilepsy or high blood pressure from the definition of disabled and the protection of the ADA. The Court disagreed, stating that "the use or nonuse of a corrective device does not determine whether an individual is disabled; that determination depends on whether the limitations an individual with an impairment actually faces are in fact substantially limiting." In other words, the Court now clearly requires a person to prove that he or she was actually disabled, not simply impaired, in a disability discrimination lawsuit.
5. What Are The Circumstances Under Which Punitive Damages May Be Awarded Against An Employer For Discriminatory Conduct?
In 1991, Congress amended the Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act and the Americans With Disabilities Act to permit individual alleging discrimination in employment to sue their employer for punitive damages, as well as other remedies. Under the statute, punitive damages are only available in cases of intentional discrimination if the employer acted "with malice or with reckless indifference" to the individual's federally protected rights.
Some courts have interpreted this statute to require the plaintiff to prove both that the employer acted with a evil motive or state-of-mind, and that its conduct was outrageous or egregious. Other courts have interpreted the statute to require only proof of the employer's state of mind.
In Kolstad, the Court agreed with the state-of-mind cases. The court held that the terms "malice" and "reckless disregard" pertain to the employer's subjective knowledge that it may be acting in violation of federal law, not simply that its awareness that it is engaging in discrimination. Separate proof that the employer's conduct in discriminating was outrageous is not necessary, although such conduct may be relevant to the employer's state of mind. Applying this subjective standard, the Court held that an employer would not be liable for punitive damages where the employer was simply unaware of the relevant federal prohibition; the employer believed the discrimination to be lawful; the underlying theory of discrimination was novel or poorly recognized; or the employer reasonably believed that its discrimination satisfied a defense or exception to liability.
The Court also adopted guidelines for imposing punitive damages on an employer because of discrimination engaged in by its employee. An employer is not liable for the discriminatory employment decisions of its managerial employees where those decisions are contrary to the employer's good faith efforts to comply with the Civil Rights Acts and the ADA. Under this standard, to impose punitive damages on an employer for the discriminatory act of its employee, a plaintiff must show that the employee making the discriminatory decision was employed in a managerial position and acted with malice or in reckless indifference to the employee's federal rights. The employer may then escape liability for punitive damages by showing that it made a good faith effort to comply with the federal statutes, for example, by adopting and following a written sexual harassment policy.
By making it easier for plaintiffs to prove punitive damages, the Court has potentially increased the amount of litigation on this issue in employment discrimination cases. Additionally, by providing employers with a potential total defense to claims for punitive damages, the Court has also increased the likelihood that employers will litigate these claims more vigorously.
© 1999 by Elliott A. Myles, Esq. All rights reserved.